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The “Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA 
Safeguards” was established by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1978. Since the very beginning, the overall aims of 
this unlimited project called the “German Member State Support Programme” (GER MSSP) have 
been to cooperate with the IAEA in developing state-of-art methods and techniques, to assure the 
supply with the developed methods and techniques, to provide training, expert advice and 
consultancy on safeguards issues, to delegate cost-free experts to the IAEA, and to inform the 
IAEA, as early as possible, about Germany's nuclear plans and projects. By 2016, the German 
MSSP has completed more than 160 tasks, issued more than 420 progress reports and more than 
100 technical documents. The German Member State Support Programme currently comprises 20 
active tasks. The activities have always been carried out in close cooperation between the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, IAEA, 
EURATOM, research institutions and universities, government agencies, nuclear industry, 
commercial developers, and other IAEA Member State Support Programmes. Most of the 
safeguards instrumentation developed by the German MSSP has been implemented by the IAEA 
and EURATOM for routine inspection use. Moreover, facility specific safeguards approaches have 
been developed for nuclear research centers as well as for the total nuclear fuel cycle including 
direct final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository. The German MSSP has 
supported the IAEA in the implementation of the Additional Protocol and in the evolution of State-
level safeguards. The paper reviews the achievements since 2013 [1], presents the current main 




The “Joint Programme on the Technical Development and Further Improvement of IAEA 
Safeguards” was offered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1978, as the response to the NPT obliging Germany 
to cooperate with the IAEA in order to facilitate the application of IAEA Safeguards in Germany. 
Since its official acceptance by the IAEA Director General in October 1978, more than 180 tasks 
have been performed in close cooperation between the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Energy (BMWi), IAEA, EURATOM, research institutions and universities, government agencies, 
nuclear industry, commercial developers, and other IAEA Member States Support Programmes.  
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The German Member State Support Programme (GER MSSP) emphasizes the joint development of 
methods and techniques and their commercial provision to the IAEA. In addition, the IAEA is 
supported by the delegation of cost-free experts to IAEA headquarters. Another essential objective 
is the as early as possible provision of information about nuclear plans and projects in Germany. 
Furthermore, the GER MSSP offers the possibility to conduct field tests in commercial facilities, in 
order to study the performance of newly developed safeguards equipment and procedures under 
realistic in-field conditions.  
 
Most of the safeguards instrumentation developed by the German Member State Support 
Programme to the IAEA has been implemented by the IAEA and EURATOM for routine inspection 
use. Recent instrumentation tasks have focused on the development and implementation of 
containment and surveillance systems (Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS), Electronic 
Optical Sealing System (EOSS)), and measurement methods and techniques for the nondestructive 
assay of nuclear material (Digital MiniMCA, safeguards-specific user interface for the hand-held 
gamma spectrometer HM-5). 
 
Moreover, facility specific safeguards approaches have been developed for nuclear research centers 
as well as for the total nuclear fuel cycle including direct final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a 
geological repository. The German Member State Support Programme has supported the IAEA in 
the implementation of the Additional Protocol and in the evolution of State-level safeguards. By 
using mathematical models, procedures for estimating optimal inspection strategies as well as for 
supporting the IAEA’s State-level concept (e.g. acquisition path analysis) have been advanced. 
 
Since 2012, the German Member State Support Programme has intensified the research and 
development activities on the destructive analysis of nuclear materials and environmental samples 
(qualification for IAEA‘s Network of Analytical Laboratories NWAL, production of reference 
particles). Other tasks have enhanced geoscientific methods and techniques for safeguards purposes, 
such as geophysical measurements (seismic, directive radar) for detecting undeclared activities at 
geological repositories, satellite imagery processing, geo-visualization and simultaneous 
localization and mapping (SLAM) approaches.  
 
For the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Germany and for safeguards research and 
development sponsored under the GER MSSP, all responsible federal ministries and federal 
agencies, state ministries and agencies, nuclear industry as being directly subject to IAEA 
safeguards, consultancy companies, commercial equipment developers and manufacturers, and 
research establishments such as research institutes and universities can be addressed and involved. 
Furthermore, the GER MSSP has cooperated with foreign partners, under joint tasks of several 
Member State Support Programmes coordinated by the IAEA and through activities under the 
European Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute of Nuclear Materials 
Management (INMM). The US MSSP has always been an important partner of the GER MSSP in 
conducting joint safeguards development projects for the IAEA; therefore, active contacts between 
US National Laboratories and German research and development establishments exist. 
 
To the end of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the joint safeguards of IAEA and EU-
Commission in Germany, the EURATOM Safeguards Authority is an active partner on a task basis 
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and a non-voting member of the Joint Committee of IAEA and GER MSSP as well as of the 
German MSSP Advisory Board, being the two steering bodies of the GER MSSP.  
 
Apart from the safeguards objective, the GER MSSP also has an economic objective, as specialized 
companies are invited to develop and produce in a high technology market segment.  
 
 
2. RESULTS OF THE GERMAN SUPPORT PROGRAMME 2013-2016 
The GER MSSP is divided into the four areas, to which individual tasks are attributed: A) 
Safeguards System Designs and Safeguards Approaches; B) Safeguards Data Collection, Treatment 
and Evaluation; C) Measurement Methods and Techniques; D) Containment and Surveillance. In 
this chapter a number of noteworthy results since 2013 [1] will be presented. For an overall review 
of the GER MSSP since 1978, please see [2-4]. 
 
2.1 Supporting IAEA‘s State-level Concept (A, B) 
The German Member State Support Programme has supported the IAEA in the implementation of 
safeguards at the State-level [5,6]. Under the joint task “Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) 
Methodology and Software Package”, some MSSPs were requested to formalize acquisition path 
analysis methodology and to develop software tools for performing this ongoing analysis in an 
effective and efficient manner. The GER MSSP has developed a formalized procedure that consists 
of three steps [7-13]: The first step, network modeling, uses the IAEA's physical model as a basis 
for parameterizing the model of all relevant processes within a State for converting nuclear source 
material to weapon usable material. In the second step of the procedure, the network analysis by 
using mathematical graph theory, all paths with their respective lengths are enumerated, sorted in 
decreasing order of attractiveness and visualized. In the third step of the procedure, the strategic 
assessment, the strategic options of both the IAEA and the State are evaluated using a game 
theoretic approach. Recently, a case study was started on the application of the APA methodology 
to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by Iran, the E3+3 and the European Union in 
July 2015 [14]. 
 
Moreover, the GER MSSP has provided studies on the application of statistics and game theory for 
the optimization of inspection strategies [15,16]. The studies have focused, inter alia, on the 
efficient calculation of sample sizes for safeguards inspections and verification, so that the desired 
detection probability will be achieved. Further, methodologies that can quantify efficiency and 
effectiveness of safeguards measures toward inducing states to legal behavior have been 
investigated. Research in game theoretic approaches to verification activities in safeguards 
(compliance verification) has been on-going for decades; however, these approaches do not appear 
to be widely employed yet. Therefore, the GER MSSP has delegated a Cost-Free Expert to the 
Section for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Analysis (IFC) within the Safeguards Department's Information 
Management Division (SGIM) since November 2012, to review and improve existing statistical 
methodologies and to develop the framework of innovative methodologies needed to support the 
planning and evaluation of Integrated Safeguards verification activities [17]. 
 
2.2 Safeguarding Geological Repositories (A, B) 
The GER MSSP is an active member of the Group of Experts on the “Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories” (ASTOR) [18]. Research and development activities have recently 
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focused on disposal concepts [19] and geophysical techniques for safeguarding geological 
repositories. Measurement campaigns at the Gorleben exploratory mine showed the applicability of 
seismic and acoustic measurement methods to detect clandestine underground mining activities 
[20,21]. Based on the results, a follow-up project focused on modelling the propagation of seismic 
waves from different sources in the salt and surrounding sediments [22,23]. Another project 
investigated the applicability of underground radar technology as a directive and wide ranging 
technology. Active radar systems could probably be used to set up a protective screen around a 
geological repository [24,25].  
 
2.3 Safeguards Equipment Development: Non-destructive Assay Instruments (C) 
Under the task “Digital Upgrade of Mini Multi-Channel Analyser (MMCA)”, the Mini Multi 
Channel Analyser (MMCA), which is a portable electronics module used for neutron and gamma 
ray Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) of nuclear material, has been upgraded with state-of-the-art 
digital technologies, while preserving the main functionality and compatibility with the existing 
MMCA. 
The GER MSSP has recently contracted the Fraunhofer INT to perform a component testing of the 
MCA-527 (DMCA). Moreover, the GER MSSP has started the upgrade of the MCA-527 to extend 
the functionality of the device towards neutron counting [26]. Moreover, the functionality of the 
reporting tool, which generates unified standard reports of safeguards measurements with both the 
MMCA and the widely used hand-held gamma ray spectrometer HM-5, will be extended to also 
cover reporting of Electrically Cooled Germanium System (ECGS) measurements.  
 
2.4 Safeguards Equipment Development: Containment and Surveillance (D) 
Sealing Systems 
While the IAEA uses the Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) for containment and 
surveillance activities, the task “EOSS Sealing Systems Implementation Support” has provided 
support for the ongoing modification, upgrade and enhancements of sealing systems at the IAEA as 
problems are discovered, capability enhancements are identified, or requirements change to meet 
Safeguards criteria. Recent issues have been solved by firmware updates.  
 
Optical Surveillance Systems 
The development of the Next Generation Surveillance System (NGSS) was supported by the GER 
and the US MSSPs and was completed in December 2011. The task “NGSS Product Lifecycle 
Support” was established to sustain the implementation of NGSS hardware over the expected 
technology lifespan for about 15 years. Similar to the EOSS implementation support, the NGSS 
lifecycle support includes modification, upgrade and enhancements of NGSS surveillance systems. 
The enhancements, upgrades, or modifications may include the need for hardware modifications, 
software development, rigorous component and system testing and status discussions.  
In a number of safeguards applications, the NGSS core surveillance core component (SCC, DCM-
C5) needs to accept input from analog cameras. Therefore, an analog camera input module (ACIM) 
for the NGSS was developed under task “Analog Camera Support for the NGSS DCM-C5 
Surveillance Core Component”. 
 
2.5 Facilitating the Implementation of Remote Data Transmission (D) 
Following the field demonstration test at the central dry storage facility at Ahaus in 2012/13 
[27,28], the implementation of remote data transmission (RDT) in the dry interim storage facilities 
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in Germany is progressing. Under the task “Testing and Implementation of Data Remote 
Transmission Security”, the GER MSSP has started to support RDT pilot tests in two power 
reactors. Recently, the IAEA has requested the support of the GER MSSP with regard to the 
replacement of the current VPN hardware, including private key storage and the cryptographic 
token. 
 
2.6 Advancing Destructive Analysis (C) 
Production and Characterization of Particle Reference Materials 
The GER MSSP has supported the IAEA in acquiring standard materials in particulate form that 
will be used to prepare quality control samples for the network of analytical laboratories (NWAL). 
Under the task “Production and Characterization of Particle Reference Materials”, a particle 
production setup has been established at Forschungszentrum Jülich [29,30]. Recently, further 
improvements as to the control of production parameters and the stability of particle production 
were made. Particles are currently deposited onto flat substrates, and a batch production of 
approximately 50 substrate samples is possible. In response to the needs expressed by the IAEA, 
further improvements of the setup are planned allowing for production of particles with smaller 
sizes and preparation of particles in solution or deposition onto other matrices [31,32]. 
 
Qualification of Forschungszentrum Jülich for the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories 
The IAEA has requested a change of scope in the qualification of Forschungszentrum Jülich as 
member of NWAL from the initial plan to provide destructive analysis of nuclear materials. In order 
to address the urgent need for suitable reference materials for particle analysis of environmental 
swipe samples, the task title has changed to “Qualification of a Laboratory for Provision of 
Reference Materials under the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL)”. The 
qualification proceeds with determination of technical requirements and the technical evaluation of 
reference materials for particle analysis. 
 
2.7 Promoting the Application of Satellite Imagery (A, B) 
The IAEA requires software and procedures radar imagery processing, hyperspectral imagery 
analysis, 3D models and Digital Elevation Model production. Under task “Signatures of Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Related Processes (Satellite Imagery/Space Borne Remote Sensing Data)”, the GER 
MSSP has provided support on software tools that assist the imagery analysts in their work. The 
focus has been on 3D models and Digital Elevation Model production from optical and radar 
satellite data [33], automated change detection using optical and radar satellite data [34-36], as well 
as on feasibility studies for new sensors, such as the emerging small satellites and the ESA Sentinel 
missions. 
 
2.8 Enhancing the Application of Geoinformation Technologies (A, B) 
In the context of task “Digital Declaration Site Maps”, the IAEA has requested support to enable 
digital submission of Additional Protocol 2a(iii) declarations. If Member States could provide 
digital state-declared spatial information using standard, compatible formats, the IAEA could 
directly ingest this information into existing and evolving geoinformation systems. The GER MSSP 
has developed a framework for the digital delivery of spatial data to the IAEA [37] and has worked 
on assessing and developing feasible conversion standards from computer-aided design used by the 
operators to geographic information systems files.  
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In support of novel technologies under task “MSSP Umbrella Task: Support for Instrumentation 
Technology Foresight”, the GER MSSP has contracted a feasibility study on the use of indoor 
navigation and mapping using simultaneous localization and mapping (FootSLAM), for safeguards 
verification purposes. Recently, the GER MSSP provided an evaluation of the PDR (pedestrian 
dead-reckoning) algorithm and the post-processing algorithm dedicated to the reduction of the usual 
drift embedded in the inertial navigation system that the IAEA is using. In this context, an algorithm 
to automatically detect landmarks of the visited area was developed, and a study on using floor 
plans to correct errors in the odometries was conducted [38]. 
 
2.9 Providing Training & Education (B) 
The IAEA’s Nuclear Trade Unit has been supported by enabling cooperation with a company in the 
area of vacuum techniques under task “Nuclear Trade Analysis Related Support and Training for 
Trade and Technology Analysis Unit”. In addition, the IAEA makes use of the GER MSSP in terms 
of occasional workshops, aimed at training its staff in contemporary export control or other relevant 
issues. Moreover, practical safeguards training courses at enrichment plants have been provided to 
selected IAEA staff.  
 
2.10 Synergies with (nuclear) security, arms control and disarmament verification 
Synergies with (nuclear) security, arms control and disarmament verification are valuable [39]. The 
tools developed under the GER MSSP for performing APA have proven applicability in a wider 
context of arms control and disarmament [40-42]. 
 
 
3. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
In the past 38 years, more than 180 tasks have been performed under the GER MSSP in close 
cooperation with BMWi, IAEA, EURATOM, research institutions and universities, government 
agencies, nuclear industry, commercial developers, and other IAEA Member States Support 
Programmes. Most of the safeguards instrumentation developed by the German IAEA Support 
Programme has been implemented by the IAEA and EURATOM for routine inspection use. 
Moreover, facility specific safeguards approaches have been developed for nuclear research centers 
as well as for the total nuclear fuel cycle including direct final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a 
geological repository. The GER MSSP has supported the IAEA in the implementation of the 
safeguards at the State-level. 
 
The activities and experiences of the GER MSSP in the past 38 years have resulted in some key 
lessons learned: 
1. Member States Support Programmes have proven to be a powerful vehicle in safeguards 
implementation, as they a) involve efficiency gains for both IAEA and operators through the 
development of suitable concepts, methods and techniques, b) allow for close cooperation 
between operators and the IAEA in field tests and trainings activities on site, and c) facilitate 
exchange between the IAEA and the respective MS through the delegation of JPOs and CFEs to 
the IAEA, and provision of expert advice and consultancy. 
2. Safeguards research and development in support of implementing safeguards is highly 
interdisciplinary and benefits from the involvement of experts from very different scientific 
areas, such as nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, nuclear/radiochemistry, mathematics, 
geoscience, computer science, political science and law.  
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3. Close cooperation between MSSP coordinators and contractors (research labs, nuclear industry, 
commercial developers), IAEA, regional/national safeguards authorities, and operators is 
essential, in order to efficiently address the requirements and needs of all parties involved. 
4. Customized safeguards equipment usually comes in small series production, often from small 
manufacturers committed to international safeguards. The user requirements for IAEA 
safeguards equipment regarding reliability and data security are especially challenging and thus 
call for special designs in many cased. At the same time, commercialization of developed 
prototypes often implies high production costs and low production rates; therefore, industry may 
have low interest in performing developments for the IAEA, even though development costs are 
fully funded by the MSSP.  
5. Synergies with (nuclear) security, arms control and disarmament verification can be valuable 
and should be taken into consideration. 
 
For future development and implementation support under the MSSPs, the GER MSSPs proposes to 
carefully address key challenges as to: 
1. Research and development strategy: While MSSPs usually come along with some 
administrative procedures, it will be important to maintain flexibility and agility in order to 
support new priorities (resulting from, i.a., SCL implementation) and new activities (e.g. in 
context of the JCPOA). 
2. Instrumentation: In future development tasks, rising economical request for commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) solutions and the user requirements given increased information security risks 
need to be balanced. 
3. Technology foresight: Assuming that a lot of useful technologies exist among the many 
emerging technologies today that have not yet utilized by the IAEA, the MSSPs should carry on 
assisting the IAEA in scanning the horizon for novel technologies and ensuring that the Agency 
is fully aware of technical developments in particular areas. 
4. Safeguards culture: Both IAEA and experienced MSSPs should continue to consider using 
MSSPs as a vehicle for safeguards implementation in States under safeguards, in particular for 
newcomer States [43]. Experienced MSSPs could act as a kind of mentor for States that intend 
to establish a MSSP. 
5. Human resources: While safeguards research, development and implementation support is a 
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